• The objectives we aspire to achieve will require global solidarity and exchange of experiences and best practices. In this respect, it is essential that resources and expertise continue to be provided by our development partners under auspices of the FAO and WHO;
•  Food production will not be sustainable if it is pursued, as indeed was the case in some instances, at the cost of irreversible environmental degradation. There is thus an urgent need to address this dichotomy in a manner that would ensure long-term sustainability.
• Excessive volatility of prices of food and agricultural commodities are negatively impacting food and nutrition security. This recurrent problem requires continuous monitoring and the availability of practical packages as cushion of its occurrence. 

Eritrean Liberation Front, 1965 - Image Credit: Jack Kramer

• The European-staffed Ethiopian Embassy told Kramer that he did not need a visa for Ethiopia and that he could get it at the border.


• Kramer made his way to Port Sudan and then to Kassala, Sudan.  On arrival, he asked the Ethiopian Consulate in Kassala for a visa and was told that they would have to contact Addis Ababa for a reply. He was asked to wait.


• For the first time, he heard about Eritrea and its fight against Ethiopia in Kassala. Kidane Kiflu introduced himself to Kramer.³


• The following evening, Kidane Kiflu asked Kramer if he was interested in meeting “freedom fighters” in the mountains of Eritrea. Kramer recalled the occasion “as if he [Kidane] were inviting me to dinner.”⁴


• Kramer got a firm no from the Ethiopian Consulate.


• Kramer took up Kidane’s offer and decided to go to Eritrea without an exit visa from Sudan or an entrée visa from Ethiopia.


• Kramer crossed the border and traveled inside Eritrea with the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) fighters for almost a month.


• Kramer and his escort arrived near Halhal, Eritrea, a few days after the Battle of Halhal. At the time of the battle they were fifteen kilometers (about ten miles) southwest of Halhal.⁵

• Eritrea was Italy’s first colony. Italy ruled Eritrea from 1890 until 1941.


• Eritrea was the first to be freed by the Allied forces in 1941. As a result, Great Britain ruled Eritrea from 1941 to 1952.


• From 1952 until 1962 Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia.


• In 1962 Ethiopia abolished the federation and ruled Eritrea until 1991.


• In 1961 the ELF began the armed struggle against Ethiopia.


• By 1965, the ELF had divided Eritrea into five military zones/divisions (modeled after Algeria’s Front Liberation Nationale [FLN]) to fight against Ethiopian forces in Eritrea.⁶


• The Supreme Council (SC), based in Cairo, Egypt, was at the head of the organizational structure of the ELF, followed by the Revolutionary Command (RC), which was based in Kassala, Sudan. The main task of the RC was to coordinate the five zones inside Eritrea. The leading figures in the SC vied for control of one or another of the zones, bypassing the RC.


• In 1967 Ethiopia conducted a major counterinsurgency campaign by attacking the zones one at a time, knowing there was no coordination among them. The zonal structure of the front proved incapable of responding to the Ethiopian offensive and soon after led to a political crisis within the ELF.


• A reform movement called Enslah emerged with the intention of creating a unified army and command structure. In June and July 1968 military commanders and political commissars of the  third, fourth, and fifth zones met and agreed to get rid of the zonal divisions, unify the army under a single command, and so forth. During the meeting commanders of the first and the second zones were absent.⁷

• The two political cadres (Aberra Mekonnen and Abdella Hassan) who had accompanied Kramer from the time he crossed the border with Sudan were recalled to Kassala. They asked Kramer to give them the films and the documents that he had collected for his own safety in case he was apprehended by Ethiopian security. The cadres promised Kramer that they would ship his belongings to his address in the United States. Except for one 35-mm film, which Kramer hid from them, he gave them the rest of his materials.


• Kramer was escorted to the main road between Asmara and Keren.


• Kramer hitchhiked to Asmara, the capital city of Eritrea, at one point sharing the ride with Ethiopian soldiers.


• Kramer stayed in Asmara for two weeks.


• On his departure from Asmara, the immigration officer at the airport asked Kramer why he had  not gotten his yellow fever vaccination. (He overlooked Kramer’s nonexistent visa.)


• A high-ranking immigration officer was called; he too overlooked Kramer’s visa and waved him good-bye and good luck. The unprocessed 35-mm film in Kramer’s pocket was full of pictures taken by Kramer with the ELF and made it back to the United States.

1. Migration and population movements are complex continental and global phenomena whose ebbs and flows are influenced by intertwined push and pull factors.


2. In the case of Eritrea, the pull factors have been immensely augmented in recent years by deliberate polices of certain governments and agencies who chose to encourage, for sinister political purposes, the youth to defect from the National Military Service as "slave or forced labour" was and is peddled to spice up and rationalize these polices. What is conveniently glossed over here is the fact that mandatory, 18-months period, National Military Service is prolonged solely because of Ethiopia's occupation and sovereign Eritrean territories and its continued belligerence in breach of international law.


3. The deliberate policies of weaning the youth from the mandatory National Services coupled with frantic activities by organized human trafficking have resulted in the pull factors that eclipse normative and cyclical economic push factors that prevail in every country at any given point in time.


4. The UNHCR itself has become, for over ten years now, an unwitting catalyst in bolstering the pull factors by invariably categorizing all Eritrean migrants as "prima faice asylum seekers". In the event, it is odd for the UNHCR to issue intermitten statements or shed crocodile tears "on the increasing number of Eritrean asylum seekers".


5. The Government of Eritrea knows full well the origins, underlying reasons and ultimate objectives of various machinations that have been set in motion in the past years to induce illegal migration of the youth from the country. That is why it requested the UN Secretary General to conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the various facets of organized human trafficking. This is also why it is currently involved in the regional efforts at curbing illegal migration and human trafficking. The UNHCR can be part of this constructive process if it is really prepared to review its past, misguided, polices.

Sophia Tesfamariam discussing US-Eritrean relations with Vice President Joe Biden

“…the OAU and the UN Commit themselves to guarantee the respect for this commitment of the parties. This guarantee shall be comprised of measures to be taken by the international community should one or both parties violate this commitment, including appropriate measures to be taken under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations by the Security Council…”

Muriel in Asmara depicting the challenges Eritrea has faced in its modern history - the camel represents Eritrea overcoming these challenges (Image credit: DJ Adulis 'Chedo' Mokanan)

• The sanctions are supposed to create a wedge between the people and the government. However, the UN process and the unfair ways the US maneuvered the sanction incensed the people of Eritrea that protested worldwide to express their discontentment and affirmed solidarity with their government. The people and government came closer and dealt a blow to their agenda.


• The illegal arms embargo is designed to deny Eritrea the ability thus her inalienable right to defend herself. Did that work? The people of Eritrea are capable to defend their sovereignty no matter the circumstance or shortages. No sanction will stop them from defending Eritrea. After the imposition of the sanction, Ethiopia has in a number of occasions used force and was repulsed. To the contrary the minority regime is crumbling, leading Ethiopia towards instability and social unrest. Ethiopia is no position to threaten or wage wars against Eritrea. Direct result of Eritrea’s efforts that turned the table.


• The sanction’s initial intent was to take control of Eritrea’s mining revenues.  Controlling the revenue stream means controlling the governance of the nation. Where is that agenda now? No sanction can deter Eritrea’s directions primarily because of the way Eritrea manages her resources and the economy, which is far sighted, meticulous and places capacity building in the center.


• Global appetite for resources is huge and Eritrea possesses amongst the most important resources the word needs today making enforcement impossible.  


• The sanctions levied on Eritrea failed because it is unjust, illegal, politically motivated, agenda driven and does not serve the greater good. Moreover, sanctions overall have become tool used by the US to further its global agenda. This limits its effectiveness because it works counter the interests of all nations except EU/West.    

Eritrean, Sudanese, and Ethiopian migrants in Tel-Aviv, Israel

Diaspora

According to a Western embassy (B), approximately 50% of all extended families in Eritrea have a family member living abroad. Going abroad has been a tradition since at least World War II. Thus, a well established network between the Diaspora and families in Eritrea has been in operation since then. The two percent income tax levied on members of the Diaspora is considered a ‘rehabilitation tax’ by the government intended to help financing the rebuilding of the country. It should be remembered that other countries charge their citizen fees for issuance documents such as passports as well.

Emigration patterns

Since 2013 there has been an increase in the numbers of Eritreans leaving Eritrea. The major cause for this is the so-called Mare Nostrum, i.e. the Italian navy’s operations where asylum seekers are being picked up in the Mediterranean Sea and transported to Italy safely. Thus, it has become much easier and safer for asylum seekers to cross the Mediterranean and get to Italy, many of whom are Eritrean nationals. The biggest risk to their lives is the way through Ethiopia, Sudan and Libya. In addition to that close to 100% of all Eritreans are granted asylum in Europe.

According to a Western embassy (B), 99.9% of all Eritrean asylum seekers in Europe are economic refugees. The extended families, which may comprise 50 persons, merge their savings in order for them to send a bright young relative, usually a man, to Europe. It is an investment and it is expected that the young man will send remittances back to his family in Eritrea. As long as the family knows that he will be granted asylum, they will not hesitate to send him off. But if the outcome was not given, the family would think twice before they send the young man to Europe. It was emphasized that the human rights situation in Eritrea is no worse than in most other African countries and poverty in Eritrea is not worse than in other African countries. There are no mass violations of human rights in Eritrea, and European countries do not grant protection to everyone from Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic or Egypt. In this respect, it could be argued that the Eritrean government has a point when it states that Eritrean asylum applicants received preferential treatment in Europe.

Commenting on Norway’s recent policy towards Eritrean asylum seekers, the Western embassy (B) stated that the Norwegian announcement of a possible return agreement with Eritrea had a huge psychological effect and it effectively drove down the number of Eritrean asylum seekers in Norway. That happened despite the fact that no one has been deported from Norway and despite the fact that though Eritrea accepts voluntary returns, especially when the returnees are given some money, it does not accept forced returns. It was added that Eritrea will not give assurances regarding human rights and it will not allow European countries to monitor unsuccessful asylum seekers who have been returned to Eritrea.

Military Parade during Independence Day

During the stay in Asmara, the delegation was able to watch CNN and BBC at the hotel and at restaurants. The delegation observed many people using smart phones. Internet was available at the delegations hotel, including in the lobby, where many non-residing guests seemed to be using it. It was possible to visit Western internet addresses, although occasional internet-black outs were experienced by the delegation.

The delegation observed many people at restaurants and cafés in Asmara, also in the evening.

Food and goods were available in the shops and markets that the delegation visited in Asmara, as well as shops on the route to Adi Kuala and Adi Keih. Page 6.

A Western embassy (D) in Eritrea stated that “most people who leave Eritrea do so for economic reasons and because of lack of livelihood opportunities and not because of political repression”. P. 7

A UN agency in Eritrea confirmed that hardly anyone leaves Eritrea for political reasons. P. 7

Furthermore, a UN agency in Eritrea and a Western embassy (D) in Eritrea stated that the alternative to the National Service for many Eritreans would be unemployment due to a poor economy, lack of investments and a limited private sector. P. 8

A regional NGO based in Asmara emphasised that “Sawa is not a military camp but is basically the final two years of high school. There are academic classes, some physical training, marching but no weapons training
as such.”  P. 9

A Western embassy (C) in Eritrea stated that the National Service “is not really indefinite, but when it ends is arbitrary”. P. 10

One Western embassy (D) stated that “a broadly shared perception is that the government has eased its approach to National Service. Today it is easier to be released from service and for young people today, National Service seems to be limited to a couple of years.” P. 10

Another Western embassy (C) stated that “it had heard of people in their forties who were still in the National Service, but in general, three to four years seemed to be the norm”. p. 11

Likewise, a Western embassy (B) stated that “there are indications that persons enrolled in the National Service serve for a shorter period of time than was the case some years ago”. p. 11

Finally, a well-known Eritrean intellectual in Eritrea stated that previously, the National Service could last for over ten years. However, currently the duration of service is usually between three to five years. p. 11

Several sources (a regional NGO based in Asmara; Western embassies C and E in Eritrea; Kibreab, London) stated that the monthly salary during the first 18 months of National Service is ranging from approximately 80 Nakfa up to 600 Nakfa. After 18 months it could increase to a maximum of 1500 Nakfa. p. 11

A Western embassy (C) in Eritrea stated that in comparison, a gardener working at an embassy received 3,500 Nakfa per month. An employee at a private hotel would get 3,000 Nakfa per month and a Minister receives approximately 4,000 Nakfa per month. P. 11

A regional NGO based in Asmara stated that approximately “five or six years ago, there was a much stricter recruitment procedure to the National Service. At that time, people of the National Service age were being stopped in police ID checks in the streets or collected by soldiers if they did not show up when called in. However, during the last five to six years, there has been a relaxation in recruitment procedures and one does not see soldiers undertaking round-ups of people into National Service any longer“. p. 12

Several sources in Eritrea (a regional NGO based in Asmara; Western embassies A, B and D) stated that penalties for evading and/or deserting National Service were not systematic but would most likely include detention ranging from a few days to a maximum of six months.

A UN-agency in Eritrea doubted that evaders or deserters were actually imprisoned. p. 13

A regional NGO based in Asmara stated that “there had been reports by international NGOs on relatives of National Service deserters or evaders having been forced to undertake National Service on behalf of their relatives”. The same source emphasized that “such incidents are not documented and that it is definitely not government policy to retaliate against relatives of National Service evaders or deserters. If such treatment occurred relatives would tell about it”. p. 14

A Western embassy (D) stated that in some cases, National Service evaders and deserters have restored their relationship to the authorities prior to their return to Eritrea by paying the two percent tax. P. 15

An International organisation (B) in Eritrea concurred that there is information to suggest that Eritreans abroad, including those who have left the country illegally, are able to obtain Eritrean passports at Eritrean embassies if they sign an apology letter and pay the two percent income tax levied on all Eritreans living abroad. P. 15

A Western embassy (D) stated that presently, there are no reports on returning deserters being imprisoned or otherwise severely punished. P. 16

An International organisation (B) in Eritrea stated that there were no known examples of systematic prosecution of people that had left Eritrea illegally. P. 16

A UN agency in Eritrea stated that while National Service evaders and deserters may be apprehended, the source doubted that they were actually imprisoned. P. 16

Several sources in Eritrea (A well-known Eritrean intellectual; Western embassies A, C and E) stated that once a person had restored his or their relationship by paying the tax and signing an apology letter, there would be no consequences upon return, regardless of evasion or desertion from National Service by leaving the country. A well-known Eritrean intellectual added that such a person would not be recruited or reenlisted in the National Service. P. 16

A UN agency and Western embassies (A) and (D) in Eritrea concurred and emphasised that the Eritrean government does not consider evaders and deserters as traitors or political opponents to the government.

A Western embassy based in Khartoum (met in Asmara) referred to a public statement made by the Head of the Political Office of the PFDJ, that those who have left Eritrea to avoid National Service are considered economic refugees and not political opponents.

A Western embassy (D) in Eritrea stated that a broadly shared perception is that the government has eased its approach to National Service and that it is now easier to be released from National Service, which today seems to be limited to a couple of years for most young people. P. 19

A Western embassy (A) in Eritrea emphasized that the government’s attitude towards deserters and evaders in Eritrea has changed for the better. As such, evaders and deserters are not subjected to protracted imprisonment, not exposed to physical harm and finally, not considered as political opponents. The source further stated that this change has not yet been reflected in any of the available human rights reports on Eritrea. P. 19

According to a Western embassy (B), 99.9% of all Eritrean asylum seekers in Europe are economic refugees. The extended families, which may comprise 50 persons, merge their savings in order for them to send a bright young relative, usually a man, to Europe. It is an investment and it is expected that the young man will send remittances back to his family in Eritrea. As long as the family knows that he will be granted asylum, they will not hesitate to send him off. But if the outcome was not given, the family would think twice before they send the young man to Europe. It was emphasized that the human rights situation in Eritrea is no worse than in most other African countries and poverty in Eritrea is not worse than in other African countries. There are no mass violations of human rights in Eritrea, and European countries do not grant protection to everyone from Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic or Egypt. In this respect, it could be argued that the Eritrean government has a point when it states that Eritrean asylum applicants received preferential treatment in Europe. P. 44